导读：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波，日前在新加坡《海峡时报》发表题为“BRIC by BRIC, the building of a new ‘home’ for the Global South ”的英文评论。周波认为，金砖组织并不像西方媒体描述的那样是中国的“粉丝会”，新增成员将助力金砖组织加强经济方面的合作。
【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波 翻译/李泽西 核译/韩桦】
国际秩序发生转变的明证，并非在欧洲心脏爆发的一场难以置信的战争，而是金砖组织的迅速扩员：从2010年的巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非五国，扩大为到2023年8月的11国，尽管其成员之一的俄罗斯，正直接参与着欧洲那场战争。
新加入的阿根廷、埃及、埃塞俄比亚、伊朗、沙特和阿联酋这六国，意味着金砖组织在短短十多年间扩大了一倍多，超过了其他任何国际组织的增长速度。
我们应如何看待世人对金砖国家陡增的兴趣？随着这个参差错落的组织发展进步，它将面临哪些挑战？
“金砖（BRIC）四国”一词是高盛集团一位经济学家2001年发明的，以吸引投资者关注巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国的增长潜力。2009年，金砖四国BRIC首次举行领导人峰会，一年后，这个以首字母缩写为名的组织增加了一个新字母—南非加入进来，成为人们熟悉的金砖五国BRICS。
金砖扩员反映出全球南方国家希望共同开辟一条不再受西方主导的新发展道路；各方尤其担心全球经济依赖美元的风险。
正如巴西总统卢拉在今年年初的一次演讲中提到：“每天晚上我都在问自己，为什么所有国家的贸易都必须用美元来结算呢？”对于许多分析人士来说，2022年俄乌冲突爆发后，美国宣布冻结俄罗斯央行储备，充分暴露其权力不受约束，令人不寒而栗。
巴西总统卢拉在金砖国家工商论坛上（图片来源：ICphoto）
虽然全球南方国家普遍对西方的做法感到担忧，但《金融时报》等一些评论称，金砖组织无异于中国的“粉丝会”，其他金砖国家有可能成为中国的卫星国。
这类评论有误导性。金砖组织中，新成员沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋是美国的盟友，巴西和印度也都在与西方建立更紧密的关系。
此外，尽管中国和俄罗斯共同呼吁多极化，但两国的世界观并不一定相同。
俄罗斯怀念过去的辉煌，认为自己是国际秩序的受害者，并对当前国际秩序深恶痛绝。中国则是全球化的最大受益者，比任何国家都更拥护全球化。
在俄乌冲突中，中国与大多数全球南方国家一样，采取了审慎的中立立场。同样，在愈演愈烈的中美竞争中，金砖组织里的中小国家的对策也不是选边站队。
另有一些人将金砖组织比作不结盟运动，但这种比较也是不准确的。不结盟运动的优势在于占据道德制高点，而非掌握经济影响力。
即便在扩员之前，由巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非组成的金砖五国也已占世界人口的40%，占全球国内生产总值的四分之一。2020年，就购买力平价而言，金砖国家实际上已超过了西方七国集团。这六个经过精心挑选的新成员国，代表了全球南方不同地区最重要的国家，它们将增强金砖组织的影响力和国际地位。
但金砖组织与不结盟运动确有一个相似之处：在美苏冷战中，不结盟运动以其中立立场著称。时至今日，中国将自己视为全球南方国家和发展中国家，金砖组织成员国也不想在中美之间的任何分歧中选边站队。
话虽如此，中国对金砖组织的未来发展有着重大影响。2022年，中国占金砖组织经济产出的70%，同时也是金砖国家新开发银行的最大股东。因此，中国在市场、投资和金融支持方面的贡献比任何其他金砖成员国都要大，况且中国还有在过去40年中帮助8亿人民脱贫的宝贵发展经验。
六个新成员国的加入，意味着新开发银行将更好地推进金砖国家基建投资和可持续发展的优先计划。更重要的是，它可以成为替代世界银行和国际货币基金组织的资金来源——这两个机构的资金往往带有以所谓“人权民主”为由的政治附加条件。
展望未来，随着金砖吸引力的不断增强，它面临的挑战反而将是如何放缓扩员速度，以促进健康发展。这是一个挑战，因为已有40多个国家申请加入或表示有兴趣加入该组织。
如果不设任何限制，金砖组织的规模将超过分别拥有27个成员国的欧盟和31个成员国的北约。但金砖组织国家间的政治制度和经济体量截然不同，其规模越大，达成共识就会越难。
对任何组织而言，统一思想都是一项挑战。欧盟就俄乌冲突制定共同政策的进程，就被匈牙利搞得磕磕绊绊，就像土耳其之于北约，是颗眼中钉。
解决之道，可以参考东盟“事缓则圆”的做法。东盟成立于1967年，当时有五个成员，之后直到1999年才发展为今天的十个成员国。“东盟模式”是以各方都能接受的速度，推动各项问题达成共识。虽然这种模式并不完美，但却帮助这个由小国组成的组织解决了许多内部困难和问题。更令人惊叹的是，东盟关于自身应在地区事务发挥“中心”作用的立场，得到了亚太地区所有大国和中等国家的支持。
我们也很难不将扩容后的金砖国家与二十国集团进行比较。与金砖国家一样，二十国集团主要关注国际经济合作，尽管后者的议程在很大程度上是由西方主导的。
二十国集团已经包括五个金砖成员国，即巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非。金砖是否也可以向西方国家开放大门，比如有朝一日先邀请他们作为观察员国家，并开展双边对话？例如，上海合作组织就以开放的态度邀请北约成员国土耳其作为对话伙伴。
金砖组织和二十国集团都无法单独应对共同的全球挑战。如果这两个为相似目标而努力的组织执意相互争斗，那将是可悲的。
英文原文：
The best example of a shift in the international order is not the outbreak of an improbable war in the heartland of Europe, but the rapid expansion of BRICS from a clutch of five nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in 2010 to a grouping of 11 in August 2023. This is despite the fact that one of its members, Russia, is involved in that war.
The inclusion of six more countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – means that BRICS has more than doubled in size in just over a decade, out-stripping the pace of growth of any other international grouping.
What to make of this surge of interest in BRICS? Related to this, as it grows and evolves, what challenges will this motley group of nations face?
Origin-wise it began as “BRIC” – a catchy term coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to draw investors’ attention to the growth potential of Brazil, Russia, India and China. In 2009, the group held its first leaders’ summit, and a year later, a new letter was appended to the acronym with the entry of South Africa to the club.
BRICS’ enlargement is a reflection of the interest of Global South nations in jointly carving out a new path in a world less in the grip of Western domination. A key concern is the global economy’s risky reliance on the American dollar.
As Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva remarked in a speech earlier in 2023: “Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar.” For many analysts, too, the freezing of Russian central bank reserves by the United States in 2022 in response to the conflict in Ukraine was a chilling demonstration of unchecked American power.
While concerns about the West are a shared concern, some critics such as The Financial Times have argued that BRICS is basically a “fan club” for Beijing, and other BRICS nations risk becoming satellites of China.
That assertion is misleading. New members Saudi Arabia and UAE are American allies. Brazil and India have both been forging closer ties with the West.
Furthermore, in spite of their common call for multipolarity, China and Russia do not necessarily share the same world views.
Russia, nostalgic for past glories, sees itself as a victim of the international order and resents it. China, on the other hand, has been the largest beneficiary of globalisation and embraces it more than anyone else.
China, in the Russo Ukrainian war, like most Global South countries, has adopted a position of studied neutrality. Likewise, in the ever intensifying China US competition, the response of the middle and small powers in BRICS is not to pick sides.
Some others have compared an expanding BRICS to the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Such a parallel is also not accurate. The strength of NAM is its moral high ground, not its economic clout.
Even before the expansion, the BRICS that comprised Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa accounted for 40 per cent of the world’s population and a quarter of global gross domestic product. In 2020, it surpassed the Group of Seven nations in terms of purchasing power parity. The six carefully chosen newcomers, which represent the most important countries in different regions in the Global South, will add to the grouping’s heft and Global standing.
There is, however, one similarity with NAM, which stood out for its neutrality in the days when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, were at loggerheads. Fast forward to current times, BRICS members would not want to pick sides in any disagreement between the US and China – even though China considers itself a Global South nation and a developing country.
That said, China looms large in BRICS’ future. China’s share of the BRICS economic output in 2022 was 70 per cent. It is also the largest shareholder of BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB). Therefore, Beijing can contribute more than any other BRICS member with its market, investments and financial support, not to mention invaluable developmental lessons in lifting 800 million people out of poverty in the past four decades.
The addition of six new member states means the NDB will almost certainly be better positioned to push ahead with BRICS’ priority programme of investing in infrastructure and sustainable development. What is more, it can provide financing for many states searching for alternatives to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which notoriously stipulate political conditions – often under the guise of human rights and democracy – for their monetary support.
Looking ahead, one of BRICS’ challenges is, interestingly, how to slow down expansion for the healthy development of the group, despite its own growing appeal. It is a challenge because more than 40 countries have either applied to join the bloc or have expressed an interest in doing so.
BRICS could become larger than the European Union or NATO that have 27 and 31 members respectively, if no limits are set. But the larger it becomes, the more difficult it will be in reaching consensus in a group that comprises drastically different political systems and varying economies of different sizes.
Herding the cats is always a challenge for any organisation. Take Europe, for instance. Its efforts to forge a common policy on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have run into stumbling blocks. On this issue, Hungary is as much a thorn in the side of the EU as Turkey is in NATO.
One possible model to resolve this is ASEAN, which “makes haste slowly”. ASEAN was established in 1967 with five members, but it was not until 1999 that it grew into today’s 10 member grouping. The “ASEAN way” of arriving at consensus on issues at a pace comfortable to all is not perfect, but it has allowed a group of small nations to iron out many internal difficulties and problems. Miraculously, it has also gained the support of all major and middle powers in the Asia Pacific over its role of “centrality” in regional affairs.
One can hardly resist the temptation of comparing an expanded BRICS with the Group of 20. Like BRICS, the G20 is primarily a forum focusing on international economic cooperation, although its agenda is very much dictated by the West.
The G20 already includes five BRICS members, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Could BRICS also become open to Western countries, such as inviting them as observers first and having bilateral dialogues one day? The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for example, has been open-minded enough to have Turkey, a NATO country, as a dialogue partner.
Neither BRICS nor the G20 can address common global challenges singlehandedly. It will be sad if the two groups, working towards similar objectives, are bent on fighting with each other.
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